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ubert Dreyfus has recently made a distinction be­
tween two types of resoluteness, and hence two 
types of authenticity, found in Martin Heidegger's 
Being and Time.1 The first he associates with the so­
cial virtuoso, Aristotle's Phronemos, while the second he associ­
ates with the cultural master, the world-creating individual. The 
distinction between these two types of authentic being-in-the­
world may, in fact, serve to explain in part the radical divergence 
that has taken place between Heidegger's self-proclaimed follow­
ers in the Continental tradition. While thinkers such as Jacques 
Derrida and Richard Rorty have inherited the ideal of the strong 
poet, the world-defining individual, others have embraced the 
more Aristotelian account, concentrating on our practical situat­
edness in the world.2 
The work of Hans-Georg Gadamer has all too often been 
associated with that of the former, subjecting him to the associ­
ated charges of subjectivism and relativism. However, it is here 
that Dreyfus' distinction becomes important, for Gadamer's 
thougl1t is much more closely related to the Aristotelian side of 
Heidegger than it is to the pernicious, Nietzschean side. More 
specifically, Dreyfus' formulation of the Aristotelian form of 
authenticity found in Heidegger can help us to understand how 
Gadamer's notion of openness, a frequently misunderstood con­
cept, functions within his philosophical hermeneutics. The pur­
pose of this paper will thus be to explore the authenticity of 
openness, the sense in which Gadamer's conception of openness 
entails a notion of authenticity that is directly connected to 
practical, ethical concerns. In the end, this project will require 
that we relate openness to ethics, in a Socratic sense, as a shared 
striving towards the good. Gadamer states in the "Preface to the 
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First Edition" of his first major work, Plato's Dialectical Ethics, "I 
do not assert that Plato's 'ethics' is dialectical; rather, I ask 
whether and in what way Plato's dialectic is 'ethics'" (xxv). In a 
similar vein, I will here make a gesture towards explaining how 
Gadamer's advocation of openness, as a call to authenticity, may 
in fact constitute an ethics. 
Gadamer1s project in Truth and Method is from the start an 
obviously epistemological one, concerned with outlining the con­
ditions of possibility for all understanding. Integral to this en­
deavor is his analysis of the forestructure of understanding. 
Following Heidegger, Gadamer holds that all understanding is 
predicated upon a pre given set of meanings and purposes that 
we bring along with us into every attempt to understand. We 
continually bring pre given prejudices to bear on the situations in 
which we find ourselves, these prejudices helping to determine 
all understanding. In fact, these prejudices are wholly necessary 
in that they enable any understanding at all. In understanding an 
historical text, we each bring our own personal horizon consist­
ing of our meanings and purposes into contact with the historical 
horizon of the text in an endeavor to fuse those horizons in the 
event of understanding. Understanding, as an event, has the 
structure of a dialogue between our hermeneutical situation and 
the text or tradition that we seek to understand. Gadamer thus 
rescues prejudice from the Enlightenmenfs "prejudice against 
prejudice" in order to highlight the fact that those prejudices the 
Enlightenment viewed as distorting and negative are in fact 
required for any real dialogue to take place. For Gadamer, we are 
continually caught up in the dynamics of the hermeneutic circle 
such that all understanding involves a fusion of the part that is 
the text with the whole of our background in a tradition of 
meanings and purposes. 
In this sense, the dialogical structure of understanding 
dictates that understanding reaches its fullest potential only 
when it is also a self-understanding. All understanding requires 
an application to our specific historical situation. In fact, applica­
tion is necessary for any fusion of horizons, for any real dialogue, 
to take place.3 Application thus becomes the key to saving the 
truth of the humanities from the shackles of scientific methodol­
ogy. It is the application of whatever it is we wish to understand, 
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the universal, to our present situation, the particular, that works 
to comprise the dialogic structure of understanding. Application 
thus involves a mediation of the universal and the particular that 
in fact determines both, a basic statement of the hermeneutic 
circle. "[I]t explicitly and consciously bridges the temporal dis­
tance that separates the interpreter from the text and overcomes 
the alienation of meaning that the text has undergone" (Truth and 
Method, TM, 311). It is through the dialogical encounter of the 
interpreter and the text that both come into their true being as 
they are synthesized amidst the understanding of the subject 
matter that rises up between them. 
A hermeneutics based on the notion of application is, in 
this sense, intimately connected to many of the concerns of 
Aristotelian ethics. Gadamer claims that the dynamics of applica­
tion, and indeed of hermeneutics in general, are modeled in 
Aristotle1s conception of phronesis. Phronesis is Aristotle1s formula­
tion of moral knowledge, knowledge based on the correct appli­
cation of reason to moral action. In fact, Aristotle1s conception of 
moral knowledge is very different from any form of knowledge 
derived from methodological concerns due to the fact that"in the 
moral (applied) sphere, method is in fact determined by the 
object itself.4 The peculiar fact of moral knowledge is that it is 
only as it is applied; it is necessarily connected to the particular 
situation in which it is applied and, inasmuch as the situation is 
in part determined by the nature of the one who is in it, to the 
very being of the moral agent.s 
The remaining possibility, then, is that intelligence 
is a state grasping the truth, involving reason, 
concerned with action about what is good or bad 
for a human being. (Nicomachean Ethics, 6.43) 
It is important to note that Gadamer considers a hermeneutics 
governed by the notion of application to function in the same 
way. All understanding necessarily involves an application to the 
particular situation in which the interpreter is called to partici­
pate. The knowledge arising out of understanding is thus for­
mally akin to moral knowledge. Its purpose is to say something 
about the engaged situation in which we find ourselves, not to 
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contemplate in a state of detached neutrality a purely objective 
reality. Understanding is in fact something that occurs to us.6 
Gadamer goes on to elucidate the occurrence of under­
standing by claiming that it has the structure of an expe~ence 
(Elj".11mmg) and is thus an epistemologically basic concept.' The 
activity of understanding consists of the dialogue in which we 
take part. This dialogue, motivated by the aspect of application, 
seeks to reconcile the foreignness of the historical horizon of the 
text with the situation of the interpreter. Understanding of the 
subject matter grmvs up in between this dialogue and has the 
structure of an experience (Erfahnmg). It is something that speaks 
to us, affects us, and moves us in certain directions. Gadamer 
thus claims that experience is essentially negative, futural, and 
constitutive of openness. It is negative in that it tells us something 
that is other from us or in some sense objective. It is futural in that 
it projects a sense of expectations of what will occur in the future. 
And it is constitutive of openness in that it reveals something to 
us about our situation that opens us to reality, namely our radical 
finitude. 
These three moments of experience are in fact a reflection 
of the to and fro motion of Gadamer's conception of dialogue, 
and hence of the very structure of understanding itself. The 
negativity of experience is a reflection of the recognition of the 
Other, of the historical horizon of the text that speaks to us from 
outside of our own situation. Still, this Other is essentially tied to 
us as a Thou.s The negativity of experience is thus productive in 
that it not only says something, but it says something to us that 
has a meaning for us. What it says, as something that is essen­
tially applied, pushes us into future possibilities. Being pushed as 
such, we are forced to realize our own inherent limitations. We 
are creatures always striving to understand but never able to 
fully bridge the gap between our knowledge and the call of the 
real. 
The truth of experience always implies an orienta­
tion toward new experience. That is why a person 
who is called experienced has become so not only 
through experiences but is also open to new experi­
ences ... the experienced person proves to be ... 
------------------------------------------------------
39 Gadamer and the Authenticity of Openness 
someone who is radically undogmatic; who, be­
cause of the many experiences he has had and the 
knowledge he has drawn from them, is particu­
larly well equipped to have new experiences and 
to learn from them. The dialectic of experience has 
its proper fulfillment not in definitive knowledge 
but in the openness to experience that is made 
possible by experience itself. (TM, 355, italics his) 
The realization of our essential finitude thus cultivates a sense of 
openness in that it forces us to pay ever-increasing attention to 
the real, that which is disclosed through genuine thinking. This is 
actually the true purpose of the dialectic of experience as 
Gadamer conceives it, for openness is itself a condition of under­
standing. Only if we are prepared to accept something that is 
against us can understanding, as a fusion of horizons, occur at all. 
The experienced person is open to further experiences and thus 
open to understanding itself. The virtue of the experienced per­
son is thus not that she knows, but that she is open to knowing, 
that she has the peculiar ability to reach an understanding over 
and over again in a variety ~f different circumstances. 
It will be helpful here to relate Gadamer's conception of 
openness to Heidegger's discussion of authenticity. Though it 
may not be obvious at first glance, it is my contention that there 
is a real sense in which Gadamer's advocation of openness is a 
call for us to become authentic, to real-ize our Situation.9 This 
becomes especially apparent when one takes into account the 
distinction Dreyfus has made between the Aristotelian and 
Kierkegaardian forms of authenticity present in Being and Time. 
For the Aristotelian Heidegger, the resolute real-ization of our 
unique Situation that constitutes authenticity is not a conscious 
recognition of the structure of our being-in-the-world. Rather, it 
involves a radical opening of ourselves to being moved into 
action by the Situation. As Dreyfus quotes from a 1953 lecture of 
Heidegger's: 
The essence of resoluteness (Ent-schlossenheit) lies 
in the opening (Ent-borgenheit) of human Dasein 
into the clearing of being, and not at all in a storing 
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up of energy for "action" ... Its relation to being is 
one of letting-be. (Dreyfus, 1991,318) 
The resoluteness of authenticity is in no wayan intentionalistic 
phenomenon oriented toward any specific form of action. Rather, 
the facing up to guilt that is the hallmark of authenticity here 
involves a giving ourselves over.lO Authenticity involves a recog­
nition of our being thrown into a world of meanings and pur­
poses that are not strictly our own. This, in turn, opens us to that 
world, giving us the ability to truly take it up. Our openness to 
this world is thus truly consecrated in terms of active participa­
tion rather than detached knowledge. 
The phenomenon set forth with the term resolute­
ness can hardly be confused with an empty 
"habitus" and an indefinite "velleity." Resolute­
ness does not first represent and acknowledge a 
situation to itself, but has already placed itself in it. 
Resolute, Da-sein is already acting . .. But resolute­
ness is only the authenticity of care itself, cared for in 
care and possible as care. (Being and Time, BT, 300, 
italics his) 
The openness to the Situation that authenticity demands is nei­
ther a purely practical nor a purely theoretical affair. Rather, it is 
connected to the very being of Dasein itself as a recognition of its 
basis in care,l1 a recognition that one does not 'have' but actually 
'does' by acting, by resolutely taking up the projects our culture 
and tradition hand over to us. The projects we take up authenti­
cally are in fact indistinguishable from those we take up inau­
thentically. It is rather the self-consciousness with which we take 
up those projects that distinguishes authenticity. 
For Heidegger, the transformation to authenticity 
signals a transformation in the form of my every­
day activity, leaving the content unchanged. I en­
act my authenticity in all my absorbed involved 
activity ... The transformation to owning up to 
Dasein's nullity is, of course, the same transforma­
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tion we have already described as becoming open 
to the Situation. (Dreyfus, 1991, 322) 
Thus, in responding to the concrete Situation the 
resolute individual is recognized as a model; not 
of what general thing to do, but of how to respond 
in an especially appropriate way. (Dreyfus, 1999, 
12) 
What is definitive of resoluteness is not the content of activity or 
even a general method of acting. Rather, resoluteness involves the 
ability to respond to the situation appropriately, correctly, what­
ever that may be. Heidegger's Aristotelian formulation of authen­
ticity thus amounts to a giving oneself over to openness in such a 
way as to engage oneself in thinking. Of course, this is not the 
end of the story for Heidegger. He goes on from here to discuss 
the authenticity involved in anticipatory resoluteness towards 
death, a much more Christian resoluteness that requires a pri­
mordial understanding of Dasein itself. This understanding of 
Dasein then makes possible a distinct transformation of self and 
world that is exemplified in the cultural master, someone who is 
able to take up marginal practices present in one's cultural past in 
such a way as to disclose a truly new world. However, as Dreyfus 
notes, Heidegger is never able to fully synthesize these two 
notions of authenticity, leaving his account of resoluteness some-
b' 12W h at am rguous. 
I believe, despite the fact that Gadamer never refers to 
authenticity as such in his writings, pOSSibly in order to avoid the 
implications of Heidegger's Kierkegaardian account, that we can 
gain a better understanding of his conception of openness by 
relating it to Heidegger's Aristotelian account of authenticity as I 
have outlined it here. The hermeneutic call to openness should be 
read as a natural outgrowth of the nature of understanding. 
Guided by the principle of application, all understanding is 
something that occurs to us and has the structure of an experi­
ence. Understanding is dialogical. Its essential negativity, its 
experience of the Other, continually reveals to itself its own 
finitude, thus opening it to further experience, experience of the 
real. 
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Thus experience is experience of human finitude. 
The truly experienced person is one who has taken 
this to heart, who knows that he is master neither 
of time nor the future. The experienced man 
knows that all foresight is limited and all plans 
uncertain. In him is realized the true value of 
experience ... Experience teaches us to acknowl­
edge the reaL The genuine result of experience, 
then-as of all desire to know-is to know what is. 
(TM,357) 
Just as Heidegger1s social virtuoso has faced guilt in such a way 
as to resolutely take up the projects of tradition, the truly experi­
enced person, for Gadamer, has accepted the radical finitude of 
the human situation in such a way as to become open to the truth 
of the real as it is revealed in genuine understanding. What 
distinguishes the person who is guided by openness is thus not 
what one does generally, but rather the appropriateness of one1s 
response to each particular situation. As a condition of under­
standing, openness is exemplified in each particular event of 
understanding. The open person is thus the one who understands 
most readily, just as Heidegger1s social virtuoso is the one who is 
simply able to respond appropriately to the Situation.13 Impor­
tantly, Gadamer1s account of openness cannot be something that 
guides us in our endeavor to understand generally. Openness is 
simply a condition of every particular understanding qua under­
standing and can1t be abstracted to the point of a guiding princi­
ple or method. 
Admittedly, Gadamer1s seeming advocation of openness 
often appears to have a pseudo-methodological intent. It is for 
this reason that many of his critics have labeled him a conserva­
tive, claiming his call to openness with regard to the way in 
which we approach language and tradition bars us from being 
able to adequately criticize those institutions. Yet, our discussion 
of openness here has led us to the conclusion that it is simply a 
condition of authentic understanding. Like Heideggerls Aris­
totelian conception of authenticity, it is not a general ideal with 
which we can approach texts, traditions, other people, etc., but 
rather an instance of every appropriate understanding. This in­
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terpretation also has the advantage of taking seriously Gadamer1s 
fervent insistence that he is merely describing what takes place in 
every genuine understanding. As he boldly states in the 
"Forward to the Second Edition" of Truth and Method, //My real 
concern was and is philosophic: not with what we do or what we 
ought to do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting 
and doing" (xxvii). How then do we account for Gadamer's 
seeming advocation of openness? 
It is my contention that Gadamer's call to openness, as a 
condition of every genuine understanding, is in fact an ethics. In 
his first major work, Plato's Dialectical Ethics, Gadamer claims that 
Platonic dialectic, as a shared striving towards the good, in fact 
coincides with Socratic ethics. He thus focuses on the form of the 
Platonic dialogues, noting that the inquiry into any particular 
subject matter that takes place there also functions in such a way 
as to bring the inquirers into their ownmost being-in-themselves 
and being-together. This he connects to the "positive" function of 
Socratic refutation, the bringing about of a shared search for an 
agreement with oneself and with others that is both a means to 
and the leading instance of the good. What we learn through 
dialectic, and thus through understanding in its most basic sense, 
is not merely the subject matter involved, but the basic being­
with that constitutes Dasein1s existential structure. 
This general sense of dialectic as man's giving an 
accounting regarding the existential possibilities 
to which he lays claim and regarding his claim to 
knowledge of entities in general makes dialectic 
important, at the same time, in a way that reaches 
beyond each particular object of investigation and 
accounting: it makes us, in general, JJ more dialecti­
cal," by grasping the possibility (which is inherent 
in human existence) of understanding ourselves 
and of justifying the claim to knowledge wherever 
it is made. (PDE, 100) 
We noted earlier that the true purpose of the dialectic of experi­
ence is the recognition of our own human finitude. The distin­
guishing feature of the experienced person is the willingness to 
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accept something that is against oneself in such a way as to be 
able to understand. Though this cannot amollnt to a method of 
understanding due to the fact that openness is simply a condition 
...f cyery genuine understanding, it can ~ viewed as an ethics, as 
a way of relating t~, others and to the world. in short, as a , ..'ay of 
making liS ,. more dialecticaL" 
This ethics admittedlv functions somewhat behind the 
sct:'nes in Trut/; llnd .\letiwd. StilL it constitutes a major concern in 
both Gadamer'$ earlier and later writings. Indeed, as Bernstein 
has noted, there is a latent radical strain present in Gadamer's 
,",;ark that pulls us toward the notions of freedom and solidarity.14 
In fact, Gadamer considers his philosophical hermeneutics to 
function as a corrective to the expansion and domination of 
technology and planning reason. 
The hermeneutic consciousness, which must be 
awakened and kept awake, recognizes that in the 
age of science philosophy's claim of superiority 
has something chimerical and unreal about it. But 
though the ''''ill of man is more than ever intensify­
ing its criticism of what has gone before to the 
point of becoming a utopian or eschatological con­
sciousness, the hermeneutic consciousness seeks 
to confront that will v,.'ith something of the truth of 
remembrance: with what is still and ever again 
real. (TM, xxxvii) 
The basis of this corrective is in fact the ethics associated here 
with openness. If we heed the call to openness, we will then be 
in a position to recognize our finitude, and hence those things 
that are against us, not in such a way as to methodically facilitate 
understanding in general, but rather in order to come into our 
true being-with-others. Dialectic, here, is truly an ethics in that 
only through dialogical understanding, and the openness this 
presupposes, do we arrive at a genuine relationship with the 
world, with others, and with ourselves. 
Notes 

I "Could anything be more Intelligible than Everyday Intelligibility?: 

Gadamer and the Authenticity of Openness- 45 
Reinterpreting Division I of Being and Time in the light of Division II." 

(Paper presented at the Inaugural Meeting of the International Society 

for Phenomenological Studies, Asilomar, California, July 19-23, 1999). 

2 See also Charles Taylor's distinction between authenticity (A) and 

authenticity (B) in his The Ethics ofAuthenticity (Cambridge: Harvard 

University Press, 1991, 66). 

3 "In the process of understanding, a real fusing of horizons occurs­

which means that as the historical horizon is projected, it is simultane­

ously superseded. To bring about this fusion in a regulated way is the 

task of what we called historically effected consciousness. Although 

this task was obscured by aesthetic-historical positivism following on 

the heels of romantic hermeneutics, it is, in fact, the central problem of 

hermeneutics. It is the problem of application, which is to be found in 

all understanding" (TM, 307). 

4 "As we see, the problem ofmethod is entirely determined by the ob­

ject-a general Aristotelian principle-and the important thing for us is 

to examine more closely the relation between moral being and moral 

consciousness that Aristotle sets out in his Ethics" (TM, 313). 

5 "For moral knowledge, as Aristotle describes it, is clearly not objec­

tive knowledge-i.e., the knower is not standing over against a situa­

tion that he merely observes; he is directly confronted with what he 

sees. [t is something that he has to do" (TM, 314). 

6 "For the hermeneutical problem too is clearly distinct from 'pure! 





7 "This is precisely what we have to keep in mind in analyzing histori­

cally effected consciousness: it has the structure of an experience 

~Erfahrung)" (TM, 346). 

"Thus the negativity of experience has a curiously productive mean­
, ing. It is not simply that we see through a deception and hence make a 
correction, but we acquire a comprehensive knowledge. We cannot, 
therefore, have a new experience of any object at random, but it must 
be of such a nature that we gain better knowledge through it, not only 
of itself, but of what we thought we knew before-i.e., of a universal. 
The negation by means of which it achieves this is a determinate nega­
tion. We call this kind of experience dialectical" (TM, 353). 
lj For Heidegger, Situation, as opposed to everyday situation, refers to 
our authentic 'place' within the temporal structure of being-in-the­
world. It is important to note that having such a Situation is predicated 
on resoluteness. Situation is not something we all have and must simply 
recognize. Actually, the existential attributes of a resolute Da-sein cre­
ate Situation in the first place (BT,299-300). 
46 Benjamin McMyler 
10 "Ent-schlossellheit, then, is the openness that results from acceptance 
of the breakdown of the ethical illusion oflucid total choice, and the 
realization that the self is impotent and empty. It is therefore mislead­
ing to call the change choosing to choose. Dasein does not choose at 
all. Rather, Dasein as a disclosing way of being accepts the call to ac­
knowledge its essential empty openness" (Dreyfus, 1991,318). 
II The concept of care, for Heidegger, encompasses the existential 
whole of Da-sein 's ontological structure (BT, 193). 
12 "It is hard to reconcile this claim that only anticipatory resoluteness 
reveals Dasein authentically and fully with the claim in the earlier dis­
cussion of the resoluteness of facing guilt that 'we have now arrived at 
that truth ofDasein which is most primordial because it is authentic.' 
(343) I think Heidegger was simply confused as to how he wanted to 
relate the two kinds ofresoluteness" (Dreyfus, 1999,26). 
13 "The Situation cannot be calculated in advance or presented like 
something occurrent which is waiting for someone to grasp it. It only 
gets disclosed in free resolving which has not been determined before­
hand but is open to the possibility of such determination" (BT, 355). 
14 See Bernstein, Richard. "What is the Difference that Makes a Differ­
ence? Gadamer, Habennas, and Rorty." In Hermeneutics and Modern 
Philosophy. Brice R. Wachterhauser, ed. (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1986,343-376.) 
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